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It is generally acknowledged that structures and styles of decision-making have an important
impact on what transport networks under these regimes look like. However, this has not been
a regular line of research up to now. This paper investigates this by distinguishing four types
of institutional structures that reflect various politico-administrative systems and styles in
Western Europe. It seeks to construe an argument on how these types of institutional
structures have divergent impacts on 1) decision-making speed on infrastructure projects, 2)
satisfaction of actors in the decision making process, 3) Benefit-Cost ratios for projects, 4)
modal split, 5) size of transport networks, 6) congestion in the networks and 7) investment
levels. It seeks to explain why every specific type of institutional structure has a specific
predicted impact on the form, type and performance of the transport networks and also takes
into account that institutional structure is not the only factor with an impact on final
physical outcomes. The article gives a well-substantiated argument on the supposed
connection and provides some empirical evidence, but does not claim statistical significance.
It sets a first step toward a new line of research and suggests this may prove fruitful as a
contribution to policy making.
1. Introduction
It is generally acknowledged that structures and styles of decision making have an important
impact on what transport networks under these regimes look like. Some seminal
publications, such as those by Salomon, Bovy & Orfeuil (1993), Banister (1994), Gerondeau
(1997), Cervero (1998) and Bertolini & Spit (1998) put transport networks explicitly in the
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context of their wider spatial and governmental, organisational and bureaucratic
environments. In Cervero’s Transit metropolis, for instance, the evolution of towns and cities
friendly to public transport networks in the various nations is clearly dependent on
underlying administrative processes and various settlement patterns which at their turn also
hinge on spatial regulatory regimes. Additionally, the possibility to limit and hamper car use
in certain areas and under certain conditions and the willingness of people to accept living in
relatively dense areas clearly has some cultural overtones. Denizens of Singapore and
Stockholm are more respectful of their government’s rule than are inhabitants of Mexico
City and Toronto and therefore create different opportunities for regulatory measures.
Gerondeau shows how difficult it is to harmonise road safety policies across Europe, because
of different values attached to safety, different ways in which inspection by governmental
agencies is organised and different education systems existing in the various countries. Once
again, the administrative dimension turns out to be a crucial factor for the how and why of
the development of transport policies as well as their eventual performance.
Despite this wealth of empirical evidence systematic surveys of the influence of institutional
structures on transport infrastructure development and performance has not been done. In
itself, this is less surprising than it seems, for infrastructure performance is dependent on a
whole range of factors of which decision-making structures is just one of the options and
clearly not the simplest one. Divergent geographical patterns, levels of welfare, varying
consumer preferences or still other factors have attracted more attention for the explanation
of national differences. Furthermore, the trouble is that all these factors are so much
entangled that for most of the above mentioned authors solid individual case studies were a
more achievable or desirable aim than methodologically tricky cross-national comparisons.
And they clearly led to deepened insights.
Comparisons between the various institutional structures and their effects are also very
promising, however. It is a novel research area that might offer a number of opportunities for
improving the decision-making context for the development of public transport. It is based
on knowledge how various types of institutional structures lead policy actors to set different
priorities and lead to varying levels of investment and accommodation of transport demand.
Obviously, any evaluation that is made of a country, more in particular the performance of its
infrastructure, will depend heavily on the enshrined norms - which are themselves subject to
wide-ranging prioritisation. Quality is far from being an unambiguous term (Beckford 1998).
Thus, whereas technicians are generally inclined to base evaluations on traffic standards,
economists look first at cost-benefit ratios or expenditure levels and public officials focus
more on acceptance of embraced policies by their constituencies or at the speed with which
policies are implemented. As a consequence, these analysts may have preferences for
different institutional structures.
In this article, a first attempt is made to see how four types of institutional structures
distinguished by the author impact on infrastructure performance. To do justice to various
types of analysts and their disciplinary preferences, section 4 highlights three criteria for
process quality in decision-making on infrastructures, namely speed, satisfaction of involved
actors and use of cost-benefit ratios. Section 5 deals with four criteria for product quality
(functioning of the infrastructure network itself, being the modal split, the size of the
network, network congestion and expenditure levels). With regard to the latter criterion,
more infrastructure and increased expenditure are not necessarily more desirable than less
infrastructure and lower spending. The relationship between process and product is often
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very subtle. The former European Centre of Infrastructural Studies (ECIS) made a wise
statement when it remarked that:
Much of Europe’s infrastructure, in practice, is driven by the inertia of ministerial and
local budgets, with variations caused by budget considerations (and electoral cycles)
rather than by a careful assessment of needs. General under investment may pose a less
serious problem than misallocation. Indeed, overcapacity may co-exist with serious
bottlenecks (ECIS 1996: 27).
In the long run it is the relationship between process and product and between the diverse
indicators that provides us with a reliable and realistic picture including both spatial,
economic, transport and political arguments. Simplifying complex material would merely
have an adverse effect here.
If we relate these outcomes to the countries’ institutional positions, we will gain a deeper
understanding of the relationship between decision-making structures and how certain
structural and persistent traffic problems may be caused. To get there, first in section 2 a
typology of institutional structures will be developed, after which section 3 gives some
predictions on how the four respective types are expected to affect the process scores in
section 4 and product scores in section 5. Section 6 presents some concluding remarks.
2. Four types of institutional structures
In the political-administrative process of policy-making, analytical information, data and
arguments are used by policy-actors in a political way. As a result, the way in which this
information is reworked, transformed and implemented into physical products such as
transport networks depends heavily on how the administrative rules of the game lead actors
to employ this information to their own benefit. For example, when one party is able,
through its strong position, to monopolise most of the investment funds and is in the position
to set the agenda for the debate, the variety of information used to come to political problem
solving will be much more restricted than when several actors need each other and start
setting up co-operative structures to both generate and share information. Also, when due to
a lack of co-operative incentives, information and results gleaned from evaluation models are
not shared, collaboration between parties is drastically complicated and (semi-)public goods
as comprehensive, vast and vulnerable as public transport may suffer.
In previous work (De Jong 1999), four dimensions relevant for infrastructure planning have
been distinguished, being federalism, democracy, integralism and corporatism. They were
applied to six Western countries (Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands, England, the
United States and France) and their scores on each of the dimensions were established on the
basis of field research.
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The dimensions were defined as outlined below:
1. Federalism - unitarism, expressed in terms of the federalism index (FED). A country is
considered more federal when the institutional structure gives more support to the
organisation of veto powers for lower government tiers against proposals emanating from
the state, and to more frequent taking of initiative at lower levels (intergovernmental veto
powers).
2. Democracy - technocracy, expressed in terms of the democracy index (DEM). A country
is considered to be more democratic when the institutional structure gives more support
to the organisation of veto powers for social groups (pressure groups and individual
citizens) against proposals emanating from government or scientific experts (societal
veto powers).
High scores on these two dimensions reflect high levels of checks and balances in the
institutional structure and therefore a much more even distribution of power among actors.
1. Integralism - reductionism, expressed in terms of the integralism index (INT). A country
is considered to be more integralist when the institutional structure gives more support to
consideration of all possible aspects and implications of infrastructure investments during
the appraisal process (conceptual co-operation).
2. Corporatism - pluralism, expressed in terms of the corporatism index (COR). A country is
considered to be more corporatist when the institutional structure gives more support to
the development of feelings of loyalty between actors after the achievement of agreement
between them, thus reducing the tendency to the taking of opportunistic stances (political
co-operation).
High scores on both of these latter two dimensions reflect stronger incentives for co-
operation thereby increasing levels of information exchange and the realisation of co-
productions with various parties contributing to projects. In the previously mentioned study,
a variety of data on a set of variables was collected for the countries mentioned in table 1.
The final country scores on each of these four aspects, based on an extensive analysis of
these data, are presented in table 1.
Table 1. Country scores in the four institutional dimensions
Dimension
Country
Federalism
(checks and
balances)
Democracy
(checks and
balances)
Integralism
(incentives for
collaboration)
Corporatism
(incentives for
collaboration)
Switzerland MID HIGH HIGH HIGH
Germany MID MID HIGH HIGH
Netherlands LOW MID MID MID
England LOW LOW LOW LOW
United States HIGH HIGH LOW LOW
France MID LOW MID MID
For more details, backgrounds and extensive comments, see De Jong (1999).
When taking the levels of (1) checks and balances reflected in the first two dimensions and
(2) incentives for collaboration as the key aspects to determine how institutional structures
guide the use of information, the following table of institutional structures can be presented:
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Table 2. Four types of institutional structures
Key aspects as to the use of information Many checks and balances Monopoloid power structure
Incentives for co-operation Type 1.
Co-operative interactors
Type 2.
Benevolent dictators
Incentives or competition Type 3.
Individualist competitors
Type 4.
Hierarchical determinators
Type 1. Co-operative interactors
The institutional system has a wide range of interdependent actors, who also maintain
durable relationships. It demands a combination of varied creation of information and
extensive sharing of it. Both checks and balances and co-operative structures have been
realised, leading to a high degree of conceptual harmonisation over time between actors. This
limits the extent to which actors ´blind one another with science´ during the evaluation
process, since they can acquire clear insight in each other's calculation methods. The
standardisation, acceptance and wide applicability of the models allows them to be used
repeatedly without the need for continual redesign or modification to deal with new cases.
Type 2. Benevolent dictators
The institutional system comprises relatively few actors monopolising most the resources,
who do maintain lasting relationships among themselves. As a market form, this structure
resembles an oligopoly with strong cartel formation. Information comes from only a small
number of sources, but it is widely shared. Actors have co-operative inclinations, but power
is not really evenly spread among them.
Type 3. Individualist competitors
The institutional system comprises a very wide range of actors, who maintain only volatile
relations between themselves. As a market form this structure resembles a market with a
relatively large number of players on the supply and demand sides, who do not succeed in
reaching collusion or agreement because these are mainly focused on direct individual utility.
There is a lot of individual innovation, but this innovation is only standardised after the event
or not at all. There are a great many checks and balances, but co-operative structures among
the actors are missing.
Type 4. Hierarchical determinators
The institutional system has a relatively small number of different actors of which one or two
dominate the debate. Moreover, these actors maintain few relationships. A dominant market
leader sets the agenda and tries to impose it on the other actors without need or willingness
to listen to any of them. He/she is focused on direct utility and speed of decision making.
Comparing tables 1 and 2 lead us to conclude that Switzerland and Germany come closest to
approaching institutional structure type 1, the United States to type 3 and England to type 4.
The positions of France and the Netherlands are slightly more complicated because they
cross each other when it comes to federalism and democracy. French citizens and pressure
groups are relatively less powerful, but lower tiers of government can bar central government
decisions better through a system of osmosis and double functions. The Netherlands has
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more provisions for citizens to speak out their opinions, but provinces and municipalities
hardly have any funds when it comes to transport investments. France and the Netherlands,
each other’s mirror images, are improbable candidates for a type 1 or type 3 position, but
both could swing to be types 2 or 4, depending on the circumstances. We will come to that
later.
3. Predictions for infrastructure performance
Institutional structures influence the way in which financial priorities are set. These effects of
this prioritisation can be subsequently recognised in the way the transport network has been
constructed and how it functions. One way of providing the dimensions in the institutional
approach developed in this report with explanatory or predictive power is by relating the
institutional structure and aspects of infrastructure in various countries. In other words, how
are infrastructures influenced by institutional structures? While making this connection some
important nuances will have to be kept in mind:
1. Although we assume a connection between institutional structure and characteristics of
the infrastructure network, this is not a direct causal relationship. The spatial structure of
countries or regions may represent an especially disturbing variable. Large, sparsely
populated areas suffer less from congestion than small, densely populated areas, but need
more money to ‘cover’ the territory. Furthermore, geological circumstances differ, so that
in some places construction is substantially more expensive. This is, for instance, the case
in mountainous Switzerland. The TNO-INRO studies (1995, 1996) comparing the
Randstad, the Ruhr Area and the Flemish city triangle reveal that many differences in
quality and capacity of infrastructure networks are explained by spatial characteristics.
Geographical settlement patterns  make a particular network structure more obvious than
another. Also, a connection exists between the spatial concentration/fragmentation and the
administrative concentration/fragmentation, as indicated by the NEI (1991).
2. The materialisation of decision-making in physical works takes time. This means that the
characteristics of the infrastructure network may date from institutional structures of some
time ago. In order to demonstrate the effect of institutions on physical production, we
ought to compare the institutional structure of decades ago with the current infrastructure.
Such research is not feasible for practical and methodical reasons.
However, institutions often share a highly sustainable character. Although elements may
change over time, the main structure is often the same since it is the manifestation of secular,
deeply rooted thought and action patterns. Dobbin (1994) has studied institutional structures
as they existed when railroads came into being in the 19th century. He concludes that
remarkable continuity exists in the way countries tackle policy problems. Much of what was
common in the 19th century is still relevant. In this light we then should regard his following
remark:
During the nineteenth century nation-states developed institutions for organizing
economic life that paralleled those they used for organizing political life. (...) When
nations face new policy dilemmas they design new institutions around the principles of
existing institutions. (...) I will argue that policy approaches are reproduced because
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state institutions provide principles of causality that policy-makers apply to new
problems, and not simply because institutions give policy-makers the organizational
resources that repeat history (Dobbin, 1994: 2-3).
His message, translated to institutional structures for prioritising infrastructure, is that
administrators and designers of structures automatically adopt a familiar line of thought, that
they apply time and again to other issues. This study focuses on uncovering the underlying
design logic of each country as much as possible. This enhances our understanding of how
countries operate when developing institutional structures, with the intention of displaying
strong and weak sides. In his comparative analysis of institutional structures for planning of
railroad projects in 19th century England, America and France, Dobbin arrives at some
conclusions that are remarkably close to those in this study. The following quotes are
remarkable in showing how railway investment policies in three different countries show a
high degree of continuity over the centuries:
Why do nations pursue such different industrial policy strategies today? The United
States enforces market competition and eschews state leadership in virtually every state
industry. Meanwhile, French state technocrats orchestrate sectoral growth from above,
and Britain bolsters firms against interference from both markets and state officials.
(…) Americans aimed to create a private system of railroads using public inducements.
The French aimed to create a public system of railroads with the help of private capital.
Britain's early financial policies were genuinely laissez faire: the state did nothing to
promote or regulate private finance (1994: 1, 58).
England was characterised by a practice in which enterprises and subnational governments
were governed from a distance by central government, without London making real contact
or interfering in their processes. The individual enterprise had to be protected against
government intervention, as well as against the whims of the market. America was more
inclined toward public-private partnerships in which all contributed some and no one was
fully in control. They were aimed at inter-organisational networks in which ‘community self-
rule’ and the voice of citizens and representative local governments were given important
roles. Technical expertise of individuals was not trusted. The political idea of power
distribution in the American Constitution was maintained and considered relevant to the
economic reality of railroad construction. The French considered harmonisation and
standardisation of railroads the most important goal and this could only be left to technocrats
from central government (Corps des Ponts et Chaussées). Private capital could only be used
for execution matters1.
                                                
1 Dunlavy (1992), after studying railway policy in 19th century America and Prussia, nuances the statement that
assessment practices can be directly deduced from institutional structures. Based on current practice, one
would expect in 19th century Germany that public bodies and public enterprises also financed and organised
investments in infrastructure. That, however, is not true. Up to the middle of the 19th century, German states
left railroad infrastructure largely to the private sector. Normally, the state would have initiated it and while it
did have that ambition, Prussia was still a monarchy where the king decided about the construction of
railroads. Waterways and roads were ‘done’ by the state, so that there was little money left for railroads. Had
there been enough money, as in Belgium, railroads would have been constructed by the state. For lack of
resources it was left to private investors who did not accept state intervention. In that time, higher taxes were
only conceivable as a consequence of political liberalisation. It was not until the 1840s - after much public
pressure - that state loans were agreed to finance railroads and the existing private railroad companies were
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3.1 Types of institutional structures and performance
The hypothesis that various types of institutional structures will result in various types of
infrastructure networks requires a properly substantiated argument:
Type 1: Co-operative interactors
In these structures, substantial alterations of central proposals can be suggested given the
large number of administrative and societal veto powers. The variation in ideas is increased.
For the parties involved in the assessment process, there are strong incentives to co-operate.
So the variation of information is largely adopted.
Due to the extensive number of checks and balances between actors, speed is predicted to be
low; time to reach agreement and acceptance is taken into consideration from the very
beginning. Due to actors’ co-operative inclinations the duration is relatively predictable. A
positive side effect is high level of satisfaction among participating actors however. When it
comes to the question which aspects are seen as important in appraisal frameworks, all actors
will have had some influence and various criteria, aspects or arguments have been
incorporated.
Type 1 structures leave room for all transport modes and integrate them well both internally
and externally; co-production between modes frequently occurs. Given the large number of
veto powers, experts’ projects and programmes are processed quickly and without too many
changes. As a consequence, the constructed infrastructure meets societal demand. The large
amount of expenditure is not spent on a large numbers of projects but on adequate
incorporation in the physical environment.
Type 2: Benevolent dictators
In these structures proposals by the centre can hardly be changed given the limited number of
administrative and societal veto powers. The creation of variation of ideas is therefore
limited. For the parties involved in the assessment process, strong stimuli exist to co-operate
so that this limited variation is adopted by all.
Due to the limited number of checks and balances between actors, speed is predicted to be
high; not much time is needed to reach agreement, because resistance can be expected to be
weak. This has its repercussions on actor satisfaction however; it is predicted to be low.
When it comes to the question which aspects are seen as important in appraisal frameworks,
it is the dominant (national) actor that has by far the most impact; national economic growth
and financial viability will probably prevail over other aspects.
Type 2 structures provide room for all transport modes and integrate them well internally,
but not intermodally with other modes and are otherwise not very innovative either. Given
the limited number of veto powers, experts’ projects and programmes can be executed
relatively quickly and intact. As a result, the amount of constructed infrastructure is more
than adequate, but it is used inefficiently. The large amount of expenditure is not spent on
environmental aspects, but rather on a large number of projects.
                                                                                                                                                      
nationalised. The enlargement of the power of the Länder vis-a-vis the national government was established
under the influence of the allied forces after the Second World War. Contrary to England, America and
France, Germany has experienced major changes in its state and administrative system since the last century.
This limits the possibilities for recognising continuity in the past 150 years.
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Type 3: Individualist competitors
Serious alterations in central proposals can be made in these structures given the large
number of administrative and societal veto powers. This enhances the variation of ideas.
Parties involved in the assessment process have no incentives or minimal incentives to co-
operate, As a result, the great amount of variation is only partially adopted by some actors.
Harmonisation of evaluation models is uncommon.
Due to the extensive number of checks and balances between actors and their competitive
inclinations, speed is predicted to be low, and rather unpredictable; (semi-) public goods are
only realised if all required actors see the project as relevant to their interests. A positive side
effect is a high level of satisfaction among participating actors, however. When it comes to
the question which aspects are seen as important in appraisal frameworks, all contributing
actors will have had some influence and various criteria, aspects or arguments have been
incorporated. Nevertheless, these are dealt with in a rather ad hoc and unsystematic manner.
Type 3 structures leave little room for transport modes that cannot maintain themselves in a
competitive environment, but when they can, they are both efficient and innovative. Links
are created only if they serve the players’ direct interests. Given the large number of veto
powers, experts’ projects and programmes are rarely processed quickly or left intact. As a
consequence, the infrastructure constructed meets societal demand. The small amount of
financial means is spent on a large number of small projects, which have something
attractive in it for all actors.
Type 4: Hierarchical determinators
In these structures changes in central proposals can only be proposed to a limited degree
given the limited number of administrative and societal veto powers. The variation of ideas
is therefore limited. There are minimal incentives for the parties involved to co-operate so
the limited variation is adopted to a small degree and only because the weaker parties cannot
withdraw from the monopolist´s financial power.
Due to the limited number of checks and balances between actors, speed is predicted to be
high;  not much time is needed to reach agreement, because resistance can be expected to be
weak. This has its repercussions on actor satisfaction however; it is predicted to be low.
When it comes to the question which aspects are seen as important in appraisal frameworks,
it is the dominant (national) actor that has by far the most impact; national economic growth
and financial viability will probably prevail over other aspects.
Type 4 structures leave little room for transport modes that cannot compete and stimulate
efficiency. These structures do not encourage innovation in these modes. Given the limited
number of veto powers, the lack of a central will for investment is not compensated by the
strength of other actors. As a consequence insufficient infrastructure is constructed, and
societal demand is not accommodated. The small amount of financial resources is used for a
small number of centrally selected large projects.
The tables 3a and 3b summarise the characterisations of the various structures:
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Table 3a. Types of institutional structures and process performance
Type of institutional
structure
Speed of decision making Actor
satisfaction
Benefit/Cost ratio
Type 1
Germany and Switzerland
Low but predictable High Lots of relevant criteria and
aspects taken into account
Type 2
France (to some extent)
Fast and predictable Average Financial and macro-economic
issues
Type 3
USA
Low and predictable Average Mainly financial and easily
tangible issues
Type 4
England and the Netherlands
(to some extent)
High but unpredictable Low Mainly financial and easily
tangible issues
Table 3b. Types of institutional structures and product performance
Type of
institutional
structure
Modal split Size of the
networks
Congestion in
the networks
Size of investments
Type 1
Germany and
Switzerland
Much distribution across modes;
much interconnection between
modes
Strict
accommodation
Temperate
congestion
High expenditure on
many smaller projects
(quality construction)
Type 2
France
(to some extent)
Much distribution across modes;
minimal interconnection between
modes
Large capacity Minimal
congestion
High expenditure on
some large projects
(quantity construction)
Type 3
USA
Little distribution across modes;
much interconnection between
modes
Strict
accommodation
Temperate
congestion
Low expenditure on
many smaller projects
(quality construction)
Type 4
England and
the Netherlands
(to some extent)
Little distribution across modes;
minimal interconnection between
modes
Little capacity Much
congestion
Low expenditure on
some large projects
(quantity construction)
The simplification from four dimensions to two key aspects does not result in loss of
information for most countries (in fact four countries fall nicely in their places), except for
the two mirror-images the Netherlands and France. The Netherlands and France differ so
crucially on the federalism and democracy scores, that these have substantial effect on the
functioning of the institutional structure and thus on the constructed infrastructure. As a
result, the participation of societal groups is relative larger in the Netherlands while local
governments are passive. In France, the reverse is the case. Since pressure groups and
interested parties are often less supportive of extra infrastructure than governmental bodies,
the pulling forces in favour of an increase in capacity will be stronger in France than in the
Netherlands. Furthermore, this will be focused more on capacity expansion itself (quantity)
than on spatial fit (quality). Since, for the other cases studied, the federalism and democracy
scores on the one hand and the integralism and corporatism scores on the other hardly differ,
a consolidation of these dimensions poses no complications. We expect France and the
Netherlands to swing between types 2 and 4, but due to the fact that double functions in
France create strong co-operative ties between politicians and administrators, we expect it to
be more a type 2 and the Netherlands more of a type 4.
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For the transport science indicators presented below, we used tables from transport studies of
various national ministries, Kolpron, CBI, ECIS, TNO-INRO, the UN and from previous
work done by this author (de Jong 1999). The hypotheses specified in this section will be
tested using real-world observations in sections 4 and 5.Predictions made in this section and
reality will be matched in sections 4 and 5.
4. Scores for process quality
In this section, the three performance criteria for process quality are briefly described after
which some statistics are presented to see if they fit the expectations. The three process
criteria are speed, satisfaction of involved actors and the relevant aspects used in cost-benefit
analyses.
4.1 Speed of decision-making
In practice, the ‘process time’ is often an implicit criterion for assessing decision-making on
infrastructure projects. When the speed of decision-making is the criterion, the will to act
becomes the most important aspect. This means that ideas should not be changed too often
since this would slow down the decision-making process. The line of reasoning here is that
the benefits of infrastructure will occur more quickly and the costs will generally be lower
when planning and construction proceed according to the plan. Also, a large number of
practical, administrative problems are decreased such as low expenditure in some years and
budget deficits in other years.
Quick decision-making may have a number of important disadvantages. Because of the
emphasis on pushing certain decisions through, it is possible that the contractor has little or
no consideration for arguments and contributions of opponents. These opponents could,
under different conditions, well be potential participants who would enrich the final decision.
While the costs will be higher, hopefully the long-term benefits will be greater, thus it might
be wise to reconsider before one acts. Today’s benefits may well be tomorrow’s costs. The
French planning specialist Merlin wrote about this:
Lengthy and costly projects yield infrastructures with a life span of decades,
generations or centuries It is understandable that decision-makers cannot afford to
make mistakes in such circumstances; after all, their decisions are doubly important,
because of the costs involved and because of the long-term consequences. (Merlin,
1994: 6, original in French, translation by the author).
Seen in this light efficient, but hasty decision-making (efficiency in a narrow sense) is
unwise and substantial variation of ideas and a thorough selection from that variation is
necessary. Efficiency in the broader sense means keeping an eye on the long term and being
open to quality improvement. This requires attention for coincidence, treading unknown
paths and thorough reflection on decisions before actions are taken. Such activities are never
efficient in a narrow sense.
Decision-making speed is not easy to measure. The beginning and the end of a project are
usually difficult to determine precisely, and decision-making speed may differ from the one
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project or mode to the other. Decision-making speed, in reality, is often an impression
instead of a precise measure.
Solid empirical research on the length of decision-making procedures is scarce. Using
Kolpron's data (1994), we have made the following table of only European countries. We
should realise that it concerns estimates made by national civil servants.
Table 4. Duration of the decision-making process in years (measured until 1990)
Transport mode Switzerland Germany Netherlands England France
Roads 16 16 24 20 6
Railroads 12 15 9 5 7
Source: Kolpron 1994.
From these data we derive that the length of the decision-making process in type 1 structures
(Germany and Switzerland) is long but predictable, and short in type 2 structures (France).
Both outcomes are in accordance with the predictions in paragraph 3. No data are available
on the USA. The duration of decision-making processes regarding roads in the Netherlands
and England (type 4 countries) is substantially different from the expectations. These scores
may be explained from the fact that in both countries, the Ministry of Transport is the
dominant actor and while it can limit the constructive veto powers of other parties, it cannot
eliminate their blocking power. Other actors besides the one who initiates a project
apparently do not have the power to submit policy proposals and get them accepted, but they
can prevent quick implementation and construction. That this undesirable effect occurs more
with roads than with railroads can probably be explained by the fact that railroad owners are
often the sole initiator, while for roads authority is more dispersed. Low federalism and
democracy in combination with low integralism and corporatism do not lead simply to quick
decision-making: it is likely that low federalism and democracy scores with an average or
high integralism and corporatism scores are even better. In this case, weak parties are met
with a willing attitude and receive some influence, which in turn prevents them from using
all influence they have against the realisation of infrastructure projects.
In a recent publication, The Confederation of British Industry (CBI 1995) also attempted to
present a careful indication of the process time in four countries (England, France, Germany
and the Netherlands). According to CBI, the construction of infrastructure (in general) in the
Netherlands takes 12 years from the moment that any certainty exists about the availability of
national funds. For Germany, numbers of 9 years for railroad projects and 10 for federal
highways are mentioned, but the politico-administrative discussion must be added to this.
There are no periods indicated for France but it is assumed to be rather speedy. England
takes as much as 13.5 years, basically for lack of a consensual attitude and financial
resources. No matter how much these estimates differ from those offered by Kolpron, they
do indicate that limited veto power and offensive, competitive relations certainly do no
guarantee quick decision-making. Not even when the procedures appear to suggest so.
A third more detailed study deals with the developments and changes in the national railroad
plans in Switzerland and the Netherlands in the 1988-1996 period under the influence of
their respective institutional structures (De Jong, Stevens and Veeneman 1996). It appears
that in 8 years time, the Swiss plans have gone through major changes under the influence of
several veto powers (referendum, lump-sum financing, strong influence of cantons), while
W. Martin De Jong 181
Dutch Rail project realisation may have fallen behind schedule, it is still relatively fast and
unchanged. After 8 years, only a third of the Dutch intentions has been realised and the
money for the whole programme has been depleted, while in Switzerland the maximum
amount available resulted in enormous cutbacks: the existing rail system can handle capacity
with better and larger transport material. The Dutch are quicker and more technocratic than
the Swiss. Because of a continuing budget for Dutch plans, national government and Dutch
Rail have more room to grant detailed municipal wishes. In Switzerland, on the other hand,
regional wishes have been anticipated from the start, but since they appear to take a
secondary position as a result of cutback measures, a stalemate developed. According to this
detailed study, a strong unitary and relatively technocratic country can operate far more
quickly than a federal and democratic country. According to Moser (1993), the Swiss policy-
makers have to deal with a great number of veto powers within a rather rigidly applied legal
framework. Furthermore, money, which appeared to be excellent oil for massaging and
quickening processes, was lacking for rail projects in Switzerland.
And finally, in its research of decision-making on large infrastructure projects in a number of
areas in North Western Europe, the NEI (1991) presented several conclusions in tables
(number and size of projects, solidity and time span). Up to a point, these are related to the
institutional structures in a country. It is interesting to compare the outcomes of the NEI
research with the outcomes we may expect in this investigation (see table 5):
? The number and size of projects are related to the ambition levels of actors. Oversupply
often thrives in combination with low veto power (low federalism and low democracy)
combined with strong tendencies to co-operate (high integralism and corporatism). Low
federalism and democracy scores combined with low integralism and corporatism scores
would result in a smaller number of projects (under-supply). Other combinations will not
be so distinct since opposition or veto will mitigate high or low ambitions. Number and
size of projects ought to be large in France and the Netherlands, not all too marked in
Germany and low in England.
? The solidity of a project is supposed to score high in environments lacking opportunism
and with many shared preferences. This requires high integralism and corporatism and is
unrelated with federalism and democracy. Solidity of projects should be high in Germany,
average in France and the Netherlands and low in England.
? The time span of projects is usually shortened by low federalism and democracy (‘will to
act’) and low integralism and corporatism (‘winning’ instead of vetoing). The time span
should be shortest in England, relatively short in France, longer in the Netherlands and
longest in Germany.
Outcomes are not only influenced by institutional structures, but also by welfare, spatial
structures, preferences of the population, the condition of the infrastructure, regional
differences within countries and specific events. Therefore, interpretation of data such as
these should always be done with great care.
182 The Impact of Institutional Structures on Transport Infrastructure Performance
Table 5. Characteristics of infrastructure projects in various areas
Regions Infrastructure projects and correctness of hypothesis (yes/no)
Number and Size Solidity Duration in Time
Hamburg Fairly large Yes Fairly large Yes Fairly Long Yes
Frankfurt Limited Yes Reasonable Yes Long Yes
Rhein-Ruhr Reasonable Yes Reasonable Yes Rather long Yes
Ile de France Large Yes Large No Rather short Yes
Greater London Large No Limited Yes Rather long No
Randstad Large Yes Limited Yes Long No
Source: NEI 1991.
The conclusions are:
1. All expectations for Germany (type 1) are correct.
2. The hypothesis that the solidity of projects in the Ile de France is average is not correct.
The solidity is great. This is probably a consequence of the TGV effect; it takes longer for
parties to find common ground, but once it is found, the high speed train is running.
3. The hypothesis that the number and size of projects in England is small, is wrong: the
number and size are both large. We should add, however, that the greater London area is
just about the only part of England where heavy investments are made. Almost all other
areas receive very little.
4. The hypothesis that the time span of projects in England is short or very short is also
wrong. It is rather long. There is no direct institutional explanation, other than perhaps
there is no more money. The NEI reports on this: 'Also in Greater London the solidity of
projects is limited, especially because of the reluctant attitude of government to
financially participate in large projects.' (1991: 97)
In light of the above, we should not be surprised.
5. The expectation that the time span in the Netherlands is average is not quite correct: it is
rather long. Perhaps, we see a reversed TGV effect; it does not take long for parties to find
common ground, but once they have it, they appear to have different agendas so that
consensus is only cosmetic and the high speed train is slowly moving forward on existing
track.
The most striking outcome of this evaluation of time and speed of infrastructure projects in
various countries concerns the Netherlands and England. Given their scores on several
institutional dimensions (low federalism and low democracy, low to average integralism and
corporatism) a high speed would have been expected. This, however, was not the case. The
best way to explain this is by means of the decentralisation paradox:
The decentralisation paradox: the timely consultation of lower governments by the
central government and the partial ‘giving away’ of influence may very well lead to
wider support for negotiation results and a situation in which use of decentralised
power instruments are put to use for central goals. Contrary to the expectation of many,
enhanced steering opportunities for the central transport ministry arise instead of
decreased opportunities. Centralisation of decision-making power would fuel
maximum resistance from decentralised actors and minimum use of their policy
instruments. This would result in major delays. In other words, low federalism is
certainly not a guarantee for high speed: it requires skilful management. Both the
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Netherlands and England can be characterised as countries where financial means are
concentrated at the national level. As the capital assumes that he who pays also
decides, the blocking power of spatial-juridical competences and organisation power of
personnel tends to be systematically underestimated (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof and De
Jong 1994: 48).
4.2 Satisfaction of involved actors (satisfaction norm)
A norm that may result in diametrically opposed outcomes to the speed norm is the norm that
all involved actors must be content at the end of the decision-making process - both with the
way the process developed as well as with the outcomes (Teisman 1995). In material terms,
this means that after consultation and negotiation, all interested parties who had something to
offer in the decision-making process have reached agreement. In this case, one can assume
they have ‘learned’. The amount of time from beginning to end is only of secondary
importance. Strict procedures often lead to forced or sub-optimal outcomes in which parties
may have something to offer each other but are unable to do so given rigid procedures. In
this context, the laissez-faire approach of decision-making provides sometimes interesting,
surprising and promising outcomes.
No systematic survey research has been done on the satisfaction of actors regarding
infrastructure projects, let alone international comparative research. But from case descriptions
of the institutional structures and decision making in De Jong (1999) we can derive the
following observations:
1. Germany and Switzerland (type 1), where both public bodies and societal groups are
captured in the decision-making process, have a reasonable amount of satisfaction. This is
not so much because they always get their way, but more because they have the feeling
that all individuals have a legitimate place in the process. Involved actors are content.
Non-involved actors are usually discontent, but there are not too many of those. Many
checks and balances assure many involved actors, while high co-operation assures that
they all are accommodated within reason.
2. France (type 2), where public bodies are especially contained, experiences little discontent
within public channels. However, the discontent about process and outcome among
pressure groups and citizens is much higher. Every new proposal to enhance participation
bounces against a wall of distrust. The involved actors are content and powerful, the non-
involved are not, but powerless.
3. In the United States (type 3), where the number of policy relevant actors is largest, there is
no fundamental distinction between public and private actors. This is a consequence of
the fact that actors are involved in some decisions and not in others. Sometimes they are
capable of creating a coalition of parties with comparable interests, and these win
sometimes and lose sometimes. The combination of strong checks and balances and
fragmentation of assessment process does not lead to the kind of containment you would
find in Germany or Switzerland. On the contrary, pragmatism and self-interest results in a
practice of ad hoc associations between actors in which everybody will win sometime,
without being able to predict exactly when. The course and outcome of decision-making
is something like throwing dice. Few are thus always discontent because no actors
consistently lose.
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4. The Netherlands and England (type 4) share the philosophy that public bodies and societal
groups deserve a place in the decision-making process, but they will have to fight for it.
Furthermore, every type of co-operation is created ad hoc and is certainly not long term.
No actor is really assured of his place. The number of actors that can really make a
difference during the process is small. The national transport ministry is the major funder,
and only the largest municipalities have good contacts with the capital and the seat of
government; the representatives of the various transport modes are organised in tight
monopolistic clubs, despite a privatisation philosophy. Smaller municipalities adopt a
passive attitude and environmental lobbies are usually aggressive. Every now and then
they win a battle, but co-deciding on the main course of a policy is outside their reach.
This is not surprising for England, but it is for the Netherlands which has extensive
participation procedures and open planning processes. The fundamental choices with
respect to main ports and the major infrastructure are, however, made in a much smaller
circle (Huigen, Frissen and Tops, 1993; Siddiqui 1996). Societal groups can do little more
than stepping out of the discussion, declare their opposition, buy land and start judicial
procedures. How open are the planning processes, really, when participation is seldom
equal to decision? Some non-involved but interested actors are consistently dissatisfied.
4.3 Relevant aspects used in cost-benefit analyses
In essence, the substantive motive to develop infrastructures is almost always related to
expected societal benefits divided by the costs to be incurred. As a corollary, institutional
structures that result in infrastructure projects or traffic systems with a high B/C ratio are
preferred above others. This is one of the few policy analytical norms posed and is, in that
sense, more valuable than the others which are all process norms.
Unfortunately, in terms of outcome, this norm is also the least operative: benefits and costs
of produced infrastructure systems are spread out over long periods of time. They are rarely -
if ever - predictable and they are difficult to define. They are particularly difficult to define
since some cultures value certain societal benefits more than others. Also, the importance
attached to various items under both costs as well as benefits may differ from country to
country. Furthermore, benefits can be positive as well as negative and some can be expressed
in monetary terms while others cannot; thus the B/C ratio can never be captured in one single
number. Last, but certainly not least, it is not easy to ascribe the benefits derived from traffic
systems solely to the institutional structure that developed them. Other factors may be just as
important.
It is possible to outline in general terms how costs and benefits are distributed per country.
Thus, someone who focuses on the costs of infrastructure and who does not believe in a
broader spectrum of externalities, will have a preference for results that are expressed
primarily in monetary terms. Those with a focus on the supply vision upon infrastructure and
an orientation on benefits, will prefer countries with substantial and nuanced multi-criteria
matrices.
When applying this criterion, the best that can be achieved is an indication of how and where
costs and benefits are distributed and which issues are considered costs and which are
considered benefits. In the end, such an assessment is dominantly a matter of ideology. Thus, a
focus on the costs of infrastructure will lead to little belief in the broader spectrum of
externalities and will favour the Anglo-Saxon countries which do not include the less
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measurable effects of infrastructure: only that which is directly visible is taken into account. A
focus on the planning of traffic networks and a supply view on transport will result in the
inclusion of all possible relevant aspects in their considerations. When we distinguish between
production costs, transactions costs and benefits, we develop an insight in the stronger and
weaker points of various countries:
Type 1: Germany and Switzerland
Advocates of a supply view on infrastructure and an orientation on benefits will prefer
countries with high co-operation scores. Integralism promotes attention not only for
business-economic but also macro-economic and various spatial and ecological interests
when looking at traffic issues. Corporatism results in estimates of positive and negative
externalities, as they are experienced by various parties. The line of reasoning is that since
these effects in the production process are translated by actors to third parties, they ought to
be internalised via collective action. While all of these inefficient effects in a narrow sense
probably occur, but are difficult to assess, arbitrary choices are made with respect to their
relative weight in the larger societal cost-benefit balance. Since a broad concept of benefits
will raise the B/C ratio, the construction of infrastructure on policy analysis grounds is to be
expected.
The broadest concept of societal benefits exists in Germany, where almost all business-
economic, macro-economic, ecological, urbanistic and politically opportune effects have
their place in the decision-making framework. The Standardisierte Bewertung is an
institutionalised example of this. It is remarkable that the application is, time and again, very
precise and that representatives of relevant organisations in the project team are involved in
applying the method (TNO-INRO 1991, KUB & TNO-INRO 1997). The production and
transaction costs are high, as are the benefits, especially in the spatial and ecological sphere.
Switzerland also uses a very broad concept of infrastructure benefits, but the belief in
integral policy analysis is traditionally smaller. The approach there is one of planning of the
transport network by government and transport companies and a democratic test by the
population who are expected to independently weigh their interests.
Therefore, the predictions fit the German case very well and the Swiss case to some extent.
In Switzerland, there is no comprehensive framework for appraisal, but in all of the decision
making process, transport investment projects are seen from various angles by various actors.
Type 2: France
France, on the other hand, focuses strongly on and values highly traffic and macro-economic
benefits of infrastructure and less on spatial and ecological issues. This is especially visible
in railroads that emphasise societal profits for investments, contrary to the partial multi-
criteria approach in Germany. In France, most projects also have to meet some form of Cost
Benefit analysis, but their contents are financial and macro-economic in nature and its use
takes place in much more politicised environment. Criteria or wishes from pressure groups,
lower tiers of government and citizens have very limited or no representation in these
sophisticated models. The French case fits the predictions.
186 The Impact of Institutional Structures on Transport Infrastructure Performance
Type 3: United States
By coupling public and private forces, the situation in the US is less homogeneous and
probably more favourable. Several governments encourage each other to develop creative
financial constructions, so that the effects of lower expenditure on economic benefits are
mitigated. The way non-economic benefits of infrastructure are taken into account varies a
lot per state. Some states and Metropolitan Planning Organizations (for instance in
California) have set up interactive processes inviting several participants to air their view and
suggest criteria that were all incorporated in a general framework, others focus just on costs,
financial viability and profitability.
Type 4: England and the Netherlands
Usually, economic criteria and relatively slender analyses of societal costs and benefits are
sufficient for an assessment in England. This almost automatically means that the total
benefits are low, costs are comparatively high and a high B/C ratio can hardly be established.
In the end this results in lower costs (expenditure) on infrastructure, while the direct
economic profit is satisfied. The lowering in England is mainly accredited to a lowering of
production costs by simply decreasing production. England uses a set evaluation method
(COBA), that translates all aspects in economic terms and does not consider user benefits. In
that, the zero-alternative (doing nothing) is also taken into account, clearly a cost-reducing
factor. The application of the method is evaluated by the national government without the
involvement of sub-national actors, this also reduces transaction costs. Whether this decrease
in transaction costs actually happens is less evident, given the length of decision-making and
the difficulty in establishing agreement on research data and decisions.
Like other European countries, policy makers in the Netherlands believe in more than only
financial criteria. The environment and the concentration of urban areas also require
attention. Assessment methods exist, but their use is hardly systematic: they are only used
when parties feel the need to do so2. As a result, the dissemination of the type of benefits
depends on the type of project. The largest projects around main ports and distant
connections are highly motivated by macro-economic arguments, while many investments in
public transport are argued in terms of spatial and environmental benefits. Thus, constructed
roads are justified for considerations of network completion. An absence of standardised
assessment also results in production costs, transaction costs and benefits which are highly
ad hoc by nature. In general, both types of costs are relatively low, but rising. Economic
benefits appear reasonable, although traffic statistics do confirm the image of a country very
sensitive to congestion. Much attention is given to planning issues, although these are not as
systematically researched as the ‘societal benefits’, but more as instruments for political gain.
Quite recently, a new evaluation procedure (OEEI) has been introduced in the Netherlands,
which is actively supported by the current Minister of Transport and which is used to
evaluate many recent projects. It was devised by mostly economic consultants and people
working for the Ministry and lower tiers of government have mostly stayed outside this
                                                
2 TNO-INRO (1991) concluded about the Dutch public transport situation that a rather large number of
individual studies are conducted in order to get insight in aspects such as comfort, changes in the amount of
passenger kilometres, travel time, travel time evaluation, costs of tickets, investment costs, exploitation costs,
noise, use of space, environmental aspects, and safety. Since then an integral policy evaluation for collective
transport has developed, but this has never been generally accepted or applied.
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process. Only the future can tell whether this procedure will eventually institutionalise have
real political impact. If it does, a decisive step in the English direction has been taken.
Predictions fit the English case extremely well, whereas the Dutch case remains elusive.
In sum, the three alternative approaches to process quality give diverging results. Speed
points to France as the winner, while all others are rather slow. But an institutional designer
wishing to take transplants from France has to remind himself that the accompanying losses
in terms of democracy lead to a very high citizen dissatisfaction. Contentment among players
is high in Germany and Switzerland. It is lower in the USA and the Netherlands and lowest
in England. The expectations as such were almost all confirmed.
5. Scores for product quality
In this section, the three performance criteria for product quality are described shortly after
which some statistics are presented to see if they fit the prediction. The three product criteria
for transport infrastructure are modal split, size of the networks, congestion in the networks
and size of the investments.
5.1 Modal split
The prediction with respect to the modal split is that in the United States (type 3) road
dominates and intermodality is successful, that England and the Netherlands (type 4)
concentrate their transport streams on roads while being not so good at intermodality, that
France (type 2) leaves more space for other transport modes, but that intermodality has hard
times there and that Germany and Switzerland (type 1) have a strong spread over various
modes and are also good at intermodality.
The statistics in the table below confirm most of the expectations:
Table 6. Modal split passenger transport (in %, excluding biking and walking)
Country Car ----------Public transport----------
Total Rail Other
Switzerland 1989 80.8 19.2 13.6 5.6
Germany 1991 84.0 16.0 6.6 9.4
Netherlands 1991 83.4 16.6 8.4 8.2
England 1991 87.8 12.2 5.7 6.5
USA 1992 97.8 2.2 1.3 0.9
France 1991 86.5 13.5 7.8 5.7
Sources: Dutch Ministry of Transport 1996, US Department of Transportation 1996.
The hypotheses turn out correct except for the modal split in the Netherlands, which is less
car-dominated than expected. The fact that co-operation is not as low as in England can in
part account for this. Other, mainly spatial reasons, will probably provide the other part.
For a comprehensive test of the predictions, a presentation of the modal split of the transport
of goods would be required. Figures about these, however, are extremely complicated to
generate, not suitable or simply not available (cf. Tavasszy 1996) for a number of reasons:
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1. The transportation distance of cargo highly influences the modal split. The countries
investigated vary in size, and this results in distortion of figures. Also, national transport,
international transport and transit are often difficult to separate.
2. Neither the weight transported (tons) nor the weight transported multiplied by the number
of kilometres (ton-kilometres) are adequate indicators for the importance of freight.
Furthermore, the difference in outcome on both units is enormous. Switzerland, for
instance, scores 10% for rail in tonnage and 41.8% in ton-kilometres. In other countries
these figures are more comparable.
3. The presence of waterways is a disturbing variable for making expected connections since
it requires minimal financial resources for construction and maintenance. A substantial
part of freight in the Netherlands is by inland waterways. It is unclear to what mode this
transport would be allocated in the absence of waterways. The number of waterways in
Switzerland is negligible.
4. The measurement of modal split data is complicated. Many data are not registered or are
only registered per individual transport company. National aggregate data are incomplete
and inconsistent.
Nevertheless, on the basis of secondary sources, we can make the following remarks:
1. In all countries, road dominates in the modal split.
2. The share of inland waterways is very small in Switzerland. In terms of tonnage, rail is
limited, but in terms of ton-kilometres it is about half.
3. In Germany, inland waterways and rail, in particular, are important, even though roads
occupy the largest share. In the specific case of North-Rhine Westphalia, inland
waterways are more important than rail.
4. The share of inland waterways is large in the Netherlands even though road transport
remains largest in terms of tonnage. The share of rail in the modal split is less than in any
other country.
5. In England, road dominates even more than in other countries and the share of inland
waterways is negligible. Rail is used more frequently than in the Netherlands and less than
in other countries.
6. The road is less dominant in the USA than in other countries. The use of inland
waterways is limited but not negligible. Transport of goods by rail is important - greater
than 40% in terms of ton-kilometres. The large distances in the USA, combined with
liberalisation, have resulted in profitable railroad enterprises.
7. Inland waterways are not well developed in France, relatively unimportant and, in fact,
declining in importance as well. The share of rail is smaller than in the Low and Germanic
countries and larger than in England.
In light of the unequal availability of inland waterways, the freight transport statistics are
about what we expected. The only striking conclusion is success of railroads in the USA.
This may be explained from the fact that geographical circumstances and the integration of
several modes into one integrated, intermodal transport enterprise resulted in a situation
where freight by rail was profitable.
Intermodality can hardly be expressed in data; numbers of terminals are not very meaningful.
Effects can be found more easily in how the transport modes interact. Thus, we can see that
in Germany and Switzerland public transport companies increasingly use each others’ rail
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tracks and restore old tracks for new purposes. Also, the development of transfer-points and
the co-ordination of service delivery are more advanced in the Germanic countries than
elsewhere. These issues are under consideration in the Netherlands, and France largely
develops the various types of public transport separately. Due to the almost complete lack of
public transport in the USA, one can hardly speak of intermodality. In some areas, such as
northern California and the East Coast, however, where collective transport is important, the
independent public transport companies more frequently engage in co-productions in service
delivery in order to improve the connections between their lines (Chisholm, 1989). In
England the disintegration of and competition on the ‘networks’ is the biggest issue.
Comparable conclusions can be drawn for freight. ‘Intermodal hubs’ in the USA are
economically important. The first integrated intermodal transfer point in Europe was
completed in Bremen. By now some 25 Güterverkehrszentren exist in Germany. Sea
transport, rail, road and inland waterways are connected to these. Switzerland is not a
country with large transfer-points, but the Huckepackverkehr (trucks on train) has developed
enormously, more so than in France and Austria (Swiss Ministry of Transport 1992), though
the legal restrictions to road transport play a role here. In the Netherlands, Rotterdam is
completely intermodal and a policy is being pursued to develop other intermodal transfer
points; this is in its starting phases. In France, and especially England, intermodal
connections are still something for the future.
5.2 Size of the networks
The prediction with regard to the size of the networks is that England and the Netherlands
(type 4) will have a limited capacity, France will tend to oversupply (type 2). In France, the
emphasis is more on administrative fit (medium federalism, low democracy), which may lead
to an over-investment in projects that are a valued by the technocratic elite and an under-
investment in environmental issues. In the Netherlands, the attention is directed more toward
societal fit (low federalism, medium democracy), which may result in an over-investment in
fitting in projects with the surrounding space and under-investment in network capacity. In
general, the capacity in France will therefore be large and in the Netherlands small. Middle
positions are expected for the USA (type 3) and Germany and Switzerland (type 1). In
Germany and Switzerland, rail capacity will be higher and road capacity lower, in the USA
the opposite is the case.
Table 7a. Size of the infrastructure networks I (1993)
Country Road length/
surface in km/
square km
Road length/
inhabitants
in km/1000
Length rail net/
surface in km/
100 square km
Length rail net/
inhabitants
in km/100,000
Length waterways/
surface in km/
1000 square km
Germany 1.8 7.9 11.5 49.8 1.2
Netherlands 3.1 6.9 8.1 18.1 12
England 1.6 6.7 6.8 28.5 0.4
France 1.7 15.9 5.9 56.6 0.4
Source: Dutch Ministry of Transport 1996.
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Table 7b. Size of the infrastructure networks II (1988)
Country Length rail net in km/square km % multiple tracks Length road net in km/square km
Switzerland 125 32 1734
Germany 122 42 1995
Netherlands 22 77 776
England 69 70 1549
United States 22 -- 665
France 63 45 1471
Source Swiss Ministry of Transport (1992), based on UN data.
Tables 7a and 7b provide the answers. In the first table data on the USA and Switzerland are
missing, while in the second table data on the number of kilometres per citizens are lacking.
Even more striking is the difference in outcomes for the Netherlands: the statistics in the
second table give it a road and rail network that is smaller by a factor 4. When asked, the
responsible sources were unable to clarify or explain the gap in the respective outcomes.
Switzerland, on the other hand, is given a very huge rail network, while the SBB wrote that it
had the most limited budget in relation to the number of passengers after the Netherlands
(SBB 1989). Since then, not many extra kilometres have been constructed. Yet, on the basis
of this, some conclusions can be made:
1. The networks in England and the USA are limited, as expected.
2. The German and French networks are extensive, especially rail. The Swiss networks
appear quite sizeable here, but it is possible that extra cantonal data have been added.
3. The exact size of the Dutch network is unclear. It is true, though, that the infrastructure
networks in the Randstad are less extensive than in the Ruhr Area. Intensive service
delivery through efficient use of (limited) infrastructure is a common practice in the
Netherlands - this makes the current network sensitive to growth of traffic. The
Netherlands is a typical type 4 here after all.
TNO-INRO write about the road networks in the Ruhr Area, Randstad and the Flemish city
triangle:
The highway network in the Randstad is substantially more pressured than in the Ruhr
Area and the Antwerp-Brussels-Ghent region. The day-intensity per lane is on average
20% higher. In all three regions, the most pressured connections are found around and
between the large cities. (...) In addition, the supply of other through-going roads is far
behind the supply in the Ruhr Area and around Antwerp-Brussels-Ghent. In the
Randstad there is no cohesive road network contrary to the other two regions. As a
consequence there are more and shorter replacements via the highways (TNO-INRO
1996: i-ii).
In addition, TNO-INRO supply the data presented in table 8:
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Table 8. Size of road networks in three regions
Area Network length in km/1,000,000
inhabitants
Average number of
lanes
Lane km/1,000,000
inhabitants
Randstad 99 4.87 480
Ruhr Area 118 (+19% as compared to Randstad) 4.42 523 (+ 9%)
Flanders 105 (+6% as compared to Randstad) 5.44 571 (+ 19%)
Source: TNO-INRO 1996.
Earlier, TNO-INRO (1995) concluded that the quality of public transport service delivery in
the Randstad is good in comparison to other areas, but the infrastructure was limited and
intensively used. By way of summary the Randstad is characterised by a small but intensively
used rail infrastructure network. There are approximately 170 kilometres of rail tracks in the
Randstad per million inhabitants, while there are 236 kilometres in the Ruhr Area and 305 in
the Antwerp-Brussels-Ghent area. The frequencies are much higher, so that the number of
car kilometres per million inhabitants is roughly the same.
All things taken together, the hypotheses about the size of the infrastructure networks remain
unrefuted.
5.3 Congestion in the networks
Table 3 predicted that England and the Netherlands (to a lesser extent) experience chronic
congestion problems and France experiences hardly any congestion. The other countries
experience ‘manageable’ congestion. Here, table 9 presents the empirical evidence.
Table 9. Saturation of infrastructure
Country Average use of road net in
vehicle km/ length road
net in 1,000,000/km (1992)
Average use of rail net in
train km/ length rail net in
1000 train km/km (1993)
Use waterways of class IV
and higher in 1,000,000
ton km/km (1992)
Germany 0.83 21 18
Netherlands 0.87 25 18.5
England 1.06 22 0.2
France 0.49 12 4.5
Source: Dutch Ministry of Transport 1996.
Another indicator for the same phenomenon is provided by ECIS (1996) in table 10.
With respect to congestion in the USA, only data for urbanised areas have been collected,
and then in quite a different manner than in Europe. These data include, for instance,
recording car hours of delay per day per 1000 people and the costs of congestion per
individual of the population. In these terms, the Western and North Eastern states, where you
will also find the largest cities, appear to suffer most from congestion: San Bernardino River
(California) with 200 hours per 1000 inhabitants per day and $870 per person per year, San
Francisco-Oakland (California) with 180 hours per 1000 inhabitants and $760 per person per
year, Washington D.C. with 180 hours and $740 and Los Angeles (California) with 160
hours and $660. Given the different measurement methods and spatial structures,
comparisons between the USA and Europe are not particularly useful.
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Table 10. Percentage of road connections experiencing congestion (in hours)
Country 0-1 hours 1-2 hours 2-3 hours 3-4 hours > 4 hours
Switzerland 93.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.4
Germany 92.1 0.6 0.8 1.2 5.3
Netherlands 85.2 3.8 2.8 3.1 5.2
England 75.9 3.7 6.5 2.8 11.1
France 95.5 0.0 0.5 0.5 3.6
Source: ECIS 1996.
There are no comparable statistics for rail, but ECIS provides general indications:
Switzerland, the Netherlands and England do less well in terms of congestion on rail, and in
that order. France hardly has any problems, and Germany experiences pressure in some
regions such as Berlin, the Ruhr, and Rhein-Main. No data are available for the USA.
The predictions of under-capacity in the Netherlands and England and over-capacity in
France are clearly demonstrated in the tables. The ‘limited congestion’ in Switzerland and
Germany is expressed in middle positions. Some congestion can be efficient (it is not wise to
build so much that there never is a traffic jam), but it must remain 'manageable'.
5.4 Level of investments
Table 3 predicts that the infrastructure expenditure is lowest in types 3 and 4 (USA, England
and the Netherlands) and highest in Germany, Switzerland and France (types 1 and 2). In
types 2 and 4 (France, England and the Netherlands) there is much attention for quantity
construction (a few big projects), while in types 1 and 3 (Germany, Switzerland and the US)
there is much attention for quality construction of a much smaller number of projects- either
to protect nature or through higher expenditure on rail.
The ECIS figures are presented in table 11.
Table 11. Infrastructure expenditure (1993), including maintenance (1994 prices)
Country Total/
capita
Road/
capita
Rail/
capita
Total %
GNP
Road in %
GNP
Rail in %
GNP
Switzerland 478 302 166 1.55 0.98 0.54
Germany 252 167 54 1.37 0.91 0.29
Netherlands 151 88 37 0.85 0.50 0.21
England 139 94 30 0.97 0.66 0.21
France 233 147 68 1.22 0.78 0.36
Source: ECIS 1996.
American expenditure definitions are not standardised with the European definitions and are
thus not incorporated in this table. The figures that the Dutch Ministry of Transport (1996)
provides differ slightly since the situation for England is a little less and for the Netherlands
a little more favourable. This is the case for both roads and railroads. In general the outcome
is the same. The report also provides figures on inland waterways as collected in table 12.
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Table 12. Expenditure for waterways (1995)
Country Investments per capita
(in fl 1.00/inhabitant)
Investments in waterways/length of
waterway network (in fl. 1000/km)
Germany 37 290
Netherlands 44 140
England 0 0
France 6 50
Source: Dutch Ministry of Transport 1996.
The low figures for England and France are not really surprising: their inland waterway
network is very small and they choose to keep it that way. The proportions of Germany and
the Netherlands are remarkable: the Netherlands is the waterway champion, but appears to
pay relatively less attention to the network than Germany.
All in all, the tables confirm the prediction about Switzerland, Germany and France as strong
investors. In the Netherlands and England, the costs for resolving congestion points are
apparently deemed too high.
Infrastructure construction is less easy to express in figures with regard to quality.
Qualitative indications can be provided. Spatial fit in Germany and Switzerland and the
Netherlands (which otherwise goes along with type 4 in that it focuses mainly on big
projects) is often established through high investments in public transport systems, high
expenditures on tunnels that preserve nature areas or track adaptations to preserve inhabited
areas and nature areas. Both in the Netherlands and the USA, the principle of compensation
is relevant, where the demolition of nature is supposed to be compensated through the
creation of new nature areas. In America, nature protection is also pursued via non-
attainment areas; these are areas where construction is totally prohibited (De Jong 1999). In
France, it was predicted that infrastructure capacity is considered more important than the
environment in light of the relationship between infrastructure capacity and congestion with
regard to investments. Also, the maintenance of infrastructure is considered of lesser
importance (Fourniau 1995, Dutch Ministry of Transport 1996). The same is the case in
England, which can be derived from the fact that increased pressure of environmental
interest groups is not answered by better spatial fit, but by withdrawing all projects
considered problematic (De Jong 1999). A study by Hendriks (1996) showed how ring roads
were constructed deep into the city of Birmingham with unpleasant consequences for the
living environment, while Munich made substantial investments in systems of local and
regional public transport.
All in all, as seen in the previous paragraphs, reality is quite nuanced and dependent on
several factors, but the expectations expressed in table 3 are generally confirmed by the
evidence.
6. Concluding remarks
In the preceding paragraphs, an attempt has been made to demonstrate a structural
relationship between types of institutional structures on the one hand and processes and
products of decision making on transport infrastructures on the other. This can be understood
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by viewing how relationships of power and collaboration between actors influence the
creation and sharing of relevant information. This differentiated use of information among
the different institutional structures, at its turn, determines what type of infrastructure
networks grow. For instance, type 1 structures with high levels of checks and balances and
strong incentives to collaborate force actors to construct networks together, because they feel
they depend on each other and the regulations punish them in one sense or another for
opportunistic behaviour. This makes intermodal and public transport easier to realise, but
those networks also take more time to develop and are probably relatively costly. The mutual
checks that actors exert on each other mitigate the whimsical desires of each of them, leading
to average network size and congestion levels (under supply or oversupply are effectively
prevented). Actors involved in the decision making turn out to be generally happy about both
quality of process and quality of product. Similar lines of argument have been developed for
the other three institutional types leading to other process and product outcomes due to their
different institutional characteristics. Though any relevant statistical exercise was precluded
because of the limited set of countries, clear indications have been given that there is indeed
a connection between institutional structure and infrastructure performance.
To further substantiate the theory and the line of argument and to make them statistically
significant further exploration is required.
This paper just intended to be a first step in the direction of a greater understanding of the
institutional foundations of transport and infrastructure networks. Other fields such as traffic
safety could also benefit from such international institutional comparisons. It promises to be
a productive line of thought, because it opens up a deeper insight into the politico-
administrative context in which policy measures are taken. Countries learning from each
other’s experiences can be a rich source of policy learning. This is becoming only more
relevant in the context of wider EU transport planning where data and knowledge is going to
be shared and certain policies of harmonisation will have to be implemented. Increased
knowledge of each other’s systems will be put their own systems in comparative perspective
and help policy-makers to fine tune them as well as serve as basic building blocks to have
these systems grow more similar in the years to come.
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